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Case Summaries
CERCLA
Donahey v. Bogle, 129 F.3d 838
(6'" Cir. 1997).
In October, 1962, defen-
dant Helen L. Bogle, bought a piece
of industrial property in Marysville,
Michigan. On the same day, she
rented out the use of this land to the
co-defendant, St. Clair Rubber
Company, which was solely owned
by her brother, Seabourne
Livingstone. St. Clair Rubber
Company produced various rubber
products and adhesives. During its
manufacturing process, St. Clair
created a waste by-product which
was drained off into 55 gallon
drums. In the early 1970s, St.
Clair's employees transported these
drums of waste to the property St.
Clair rented from Bogle and
allowed the sludge to drain out of
the drums and onto the land for
approximately one week. The
employees then would burn the
sludge at the end of the week. Later
in that same decade, St. Clair
stopped this process of dumping
and burning the sludge.
In the fall of 1981. the
plaintiff, Richard Donahey, consid-
ered buying the land so that he could
rent out the use to Daca Manufactur-
ing, Inc., a corporation in which he
had an interest. While considering
this purchase, Donahey inspected
the land and realized, based upon
his own manufacturing experience,
that the land was a site for the
dumping of hazardous waste. Be-
fore agreeing to purchase this land
from Bogle, the plaintiff entered
into an agreement with St. Clair to
restore the property to an "environ-
mentally satisfactory condition"
and to indemnify him for costs
resulting from any of St. Clair's
dumping activities. On January 6,
1982, the plaintiff purchased the
land from Bogle for $115,000;
$28,750 down and the remainder in
monthly installments at I 1% inter-
est. The plaintiff deeded the land to
himself and his spouse and they
then leased the property to Daca
Manufacturing.
Soon thereafter, the former
St. Clair employees revealed the
dumping activities to the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources
("MDNR"). Also, the local
newspaper published an article in
1985 about the land's contamina-
tion and the threat that it imposed on
the city by being close to the local
water supply. MDNR mandated to
the plaintiffs, as the property
owners, that an environmental
evaluation of the property must be
conducted. In response, the plain-
tiffs hired Lawrence Halfen, an
environmental consultant, to create
a remediation plan. He proposed an
initial plan which would cost
between $30,000 and $35,000.
While conducting this plan, he ran
into unforseen problems, finding
buried pits six to ten feet deep. After
failing to resolve these problems
through his initial efforts, he
proposed a second plan in 1987
with an estimated cost of $450,000.
In 1987, the plaintiffs
requested the defendant Bogle, the
previous owner, to assist in com-
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pensating for this expensive plan
and notified her that the future
payments on the land contract
would be placed in an escrow
account. In response, Bogle com-
municated to the plaintiffs that she
was accelerating the payments due
under the contract. No communica-
tion was made to St. Clair Company
because it ceased to exist as a
corporation in the early 1980s.
On November 6, 1987, the
plaintiffs filed an eleven-count
complaint in the United States
District Court of the Eastern District
of Michigan against Bogle, St. Clair
Rubber Company, and Seabourne
Livingstone. The plaintiffs peti-
tioned that the purchase contract
with Bogle should be rescinded and
that all costs that the plaintiffs
incurred in their attempt to clean up
the land should be recovered from
the defendants. They also stated that
they were entitled to attorney's fees
under § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA
from the defendants. Defendant
Bogle responded with a counter-
claim asserting that the land
contract was breached and she was
entitled to all unpaid amounts plus
interest. She also claimed that she
was not a covered party under
CERCLA, but that Livingstone and
the plaintiffs were the only covered
parties under CERCLA.
On October 1, 1991, the
District Court held that the plaintiffs
were obligated under the agreement
to pay defendant Bogle within ten
days of the judgement, including
pre- and post- judgment interest. It
also concluded that defendant
Livingstone was not a responsible
party as an "owner" under 42
U.S.C. §9607(a)(2), since the facts
of the case did not show that he
played an active role in St. Clair's
environmental activities. The Court
also concluded that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to recover any of
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the attorney's fees from the defen-
dant as recoverable response costs
under CERCLA. Furthermore, the
court forbade the plaintiffs from
abandoning the land and concluded
that the land belonged to them.
In 1992, the United States
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld that defendant Bogle was
entitled to the further payments
under the agreement with the
plaintiff However, it reversed the
lower court in part. It held that
Livingstone was a responsible party
under CERCLA since he had
authority to control the contamina-
tion of the land. The Sixth Circuit
further held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to attorneys' fees and
response costs and the case should
be remanded to the district court to
determine the amount of the total
costs.
In 1994, the Supreme
Court of the United States vacated
this judgment and remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals in light
of Key Tronic Corporation v.
United States, 511 U.S. 809, 114, S.
Ct. 1960, 128 L. Ed.2d 797 (1994),
which held that attorney's fee were
generally not recoverable as re-
sponse costs under CERCLA.
On remand the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed its
previous decision by affirming the
district court's denial for the
recovery of the plaintiff s attorney's
fees as a response cost under
CERCLA. The court referred to the
Key Tronic case in support of its
decision. It went further to reverse
its previous decision that Livingstone
was a responsible party under
CERCLA. In determining that
Livingstone as a shareholder was
released from St. Clair's liability,
the court stated that the federal
courts should refer to the state law in
determining the standard for pierc-
ing the corporate veil and applied
the Michigan state law for deter-
mining Livingstone's release of
liability on the basis ofthe corporate
veil theory. The Court justified its
reversal of its previous decision on
the matter of Livingstone being a
responsible party by stating that
Rule 14(a) provided that granting an
en banc hearing vacated the
previous opinion and judgment.
Two justices strongly dis-
sented. Justice Ryan stated that the
Court was wrong in concluding that
the state law should apply to hold
that Livingstone, a shareholder who
owned 100% of St. Clair, was not
directly liable as an "operator"
under 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2).
In Chief Judge Boyce
Martin's dissent, he agreed with
Ryan's argument that the Court's
decision wrongly allowed a 100%
shareholder to be released from
CERCLA liability because of the
state's corporate veil law. He
argued that the ruling allowed
intelligent polluters to use the state
law to usurp federal law. In stating
that Livingstone should be liable
under CERCLA as an 'owner or
operator,' the Chief Justice stated
that he would limit piercing the
corporate veil with federal law to
only those shareholders who retain
some degree of control over the
corporation. Since Livingstone
owned 100% of the liable company
and was a manager of the company,
the Chief Justice concluded that
Livingstone should be liable as an
"operator" under CERCLA even
though Livingstone did not exercise
his control over waste disposal
activities.
-.Jason R. Creed
Brown Group., Inc. v. George F.
Brown & Sons, Inc., 1997 WL
768098 (Mo Ct Anpn Dec. 9,
1997).
An action cormmenced by Brown
Group, Inc. ("Brown") asserted that
environmental response costs im-
posed by the Comprehensive Envi-
romnental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675, were within the coverage
language of an insurance contract,
and as such. George F. Brown &
Sons, Inc. ("Broker") and under-
writer ("Lloyd's") were contractu-
ally obligated to reimburse Brown
for response costs related to the
landfill closure. Under CERCLA.
the government may conduct a
removal action, and then sue the
partly responsible party ("PRP") for
the costs incurred, or the govern-
ment and the PRP may enter into an
agreement whereby the PRP re-
sponds to the environmental harm
and seek contribution from other
PRPs.
In 1984, the United States
Enviromnental Protection Agency
("EPA"), in concert with a state
actor, directed Brown to close an
environmentally hazardous landfill
located on its property, in violation
of federal laws and regulations.
After the New York State Depart-
ment of Enviromnental Conserva-
tion ("NYSDEC") required Brown
to take specific affirmative environ-
mental action, Brown filed a claim
with Broker, which estimated
incurred response costs at two
million, six hundred thousand
dollars ($2,600,000); later esti-
mates placed the costs in excess of
four million dollars ($4,000,000).
After Broker declined coverage,
Brown filed suit that alleged
"property damage" under the poli-
cies sold by Broker and underwrit-
ten by Lloyd's. After the trial court
granted sununary judgment in favor
of Broker, Brown appealed.
In Brown Group, the primary
issue for the Missouri Court of
Appeals was whether the environ-
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mental response costs incurred by
Brown pursuant to CERCLA were
by definition included in the tenn
"damages." In defense of their
grant of summary judgment, Broker
asserted several arguments. First,
Broker argued Brown's "response
costs" incurred pursuant to
CERCLA were not included in the
narrow definition of "damages."
Second, Broker maintained Brown's
voluntary undertaking of the clean
up prohibited Brown's recovery of
costs associated with such clean up.
Lastly, Broker argued that because
of Brown's intentional dumping,
the remedial action taken by Brown
was not the result of an accident,
and thus not covered by the
insurance certificate.
In Brown Group, the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District relied on Farmland Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Republic Insurance Co.
("Farmland") (941 S.W.2d 505
(Mo. 1997)), decided almost three
months after the trial court's grant
of summary judgment, to provide
the analytical basis. In Fanrnland,
parties sought indemnification from
their insurers with regard to
incurred environmental response
costs; insurers argued that the term
"damages" did not include environ-
mental response costs. The Farm-
land court held, in a case of first
impression, that under Missouri
law. environmental response costs
incurred as a result of CERCLA
were "damages" within the defini-
tional language of the issued
policies.. The Farmland court re-
jected the contention that the tenn
"damages" distinguishes between
legal and equitable claims. The
Farmland court rejected Continen-
tal Insurance Companies v. North-
eastern Phannaceutical & Chemical
Company. Inc. ("NEPACCO")(842
F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988)) decision
and its progeny due to NEPACCO's
concession that the term "damages"
was ordinarily ambiguous and the
court's attempt to restrict the
"damages" analysis to the "insur-
ance context" only.
Conforming to Farmland,
wherein the court interpreted "dam-
ages" broadly to embrace environ-
mental response costs, the Brown
Group court reasoned that the
similarity between the insurance
language in Farmland and the
instant facts dictated the conclusion
that Brown's environmental re-
sponse costs were covered under the
insurance certificate. The court held
that pursuant to Fannland, Brown's
environmental response costs were
"damages" covered under the
insurance certificate. The court
found the trial court's decision to be
in direct conflict with Farmland,
and as a result reversed the
judgment and remanded for addi-
tional proceedings in line with the
instant decision.
The court rejected the Broker's
argument that Brown's voluntary
clean up precluded a finding that
"damages" incurred were "imposed
by law." As the court noted, while
Brown's clean up effort was
"voluntarily" undertaken, the state
made known that if Brown did not
act, the state would close the landfill
and pursue the costs from such
action from Brown. Lastly, as to
Broker's contention that Brown's
landfill was not the result of an
accident, the issue of what Brown
"intended or expected" with regard
to the dumping was a question of
fact for a trial court, not an appellate
court.
Finally, the Brown Group court
gave no weight to whether an
insured voluntarily or incidentally
complied with the government, as it
related to the meaning of "dam-
ages." In addition, Brown Group
noted that the Fanuland holding is
applicable to actions initiated under
CERCLA and "similar state laws";
if a Missouri environmental agency
acts absent federal involvement,
such an agency would "control" and
"response costs" thereby incurred
would still fall inside the term
"damages." Like Farnland, Brown
Group avoided limiting "response
costs" to only those mandated by
the federal government and ac-
cepted that state actors are not
prohibited from demanding re-
sponse costs associated with envi-
ronmental waste and cleanup ef-
forts.
-Troy Allen
State of Arkansas v. DOW
Chemical Company, 981 F.Supp.
1170 (W.D. Arkansas 1997).
From 1962 to 1976, the
Hercules Power Company pro-
duced various chemical herbicides
at its Jacksonville, Arkansas site. A
predecessor of Vertac Chemical
Corporation, Hercules produced
chemical herbicides under contract
with Dow Chemical Corporation.
In 1978, following Vertac's pur-
chasing the plant, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) found
dioxin contaminated wastes bled
off the 140-acre Vertac site and
polluted substantial areas surround-
ing Jacksonville.
The EPA and state agencies
filed suits against Vertac and the
two predecessor corporations in
1980 for improperly releasing
hazardous chemicals into the envi-
ronment. Vertac's successors en-
tered a consent decree with the EPA
and the Arkansas Pollution control
and Ecology Department in 1989.
The decree released Vertac's suc-
cessors from all claims which the
Federal and Arkansas governments
brought.
In a still pending 1991 suit,
Arkansas (State) brought statutory
MELPR 179
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and common-law claims against
Dow Chemical Company (Dow).
The State sued because of Dow's
failure to exercise control over
Vertac's waste disposal procedures
and the resultant contamination
from production of herbicides 2, 4,
5-T. The suit also addressed Dow's
termination of an agreement to
provide certain chemicals to Vertac,
forcing Vertac to abandon the
Jacksonville site.
In early 1994, Dow entered
into a consent decree in which it
agreed to pay $1 million to settle the
Vertac action. Subsequently, the
State brought the instant action to
recover natural resource damages
under four Arkansas statutes. Dow
filed a motion to dismiss these
claims on multiple grounds. First,
Dow contended either res judicata
or that the statute of limitations
barred the state's claims. Second,
Dow claimed that no cause ofaction
existed under the natural resource
damages theory. Third, Dow
contended that the amended com-
plaint was not timely under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP), and that under the FRCP,
the state had asserted no claim for
which relief may be granted.
Finally, Dow claimed the statutes
applied liability retroactively, as the
hazardous activities occurred prior
to their enactment, meaning the
statutes offended the notice require-
ment of the Due Process Clause.
The state relied primarily
on the consent decree's language
that released Dow from all claims
past, present or future, but ex-
empted claims for natural resource
damages under state or federal law.
The state raised natural resource
damages claims under four statutes:
the Arkansas Remedial Action
Trust Fund Act (RATFA), Ark. Code
Ann. §H 8-7-501 et seq.; the
Arkansas Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Act (AHWMA), Ark.Code
Ann. §§ 8-6-201; the Arkansas
Solid Waste Management Act
(ASWMA), Ark.Code Ann. §§ 8-6-
201; and the Arkansas Water and
Air Pollution Control Act
(AWAPCA), Ark.Code Ann. §§ 8-
7-202.
Judge Howard, sitting for
the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas,
denied in part and granted in part
Dow's motion to dismiss. The
Court first refused to bar the state's
claims under res judicata. Citing
precedent, the Court ruled that
courts construe a consent decree as a
contract and in examining the
decree's language, the Court found
it replete with exemptions for
natural resource damages clains.
Noting that the decree is in essence
an arm's length agreement, the
Court held that no prior action
barred the claims under resjudicata.
Next, the Court weighed
Dow's assertion that Arkansas
statutes warrant no cause of action
for natural resource damages. To
adjudicate Dow's assertion that the
Arkansas statutes express only a
remedy and that natural resource
damages should be limited to the
CERCLA definition, the Court
considered both CERCLA and each
of the statutes. In a rapid review of
natural resources under CERCLA.
the Court agreed with Dow that the
CERCLA definition applied to the
consent decree's terms. The Court
reasoned that since CERCLA's
definition included water, ground
water, drinking water, controlled by
any state or local government,
damage claims for water sources
were necessarily encompassed in
the definition.
Finding that three out of the
four statutes stated a cause ofaction,
the Court looked to the language
and intent of each to apply them to
the instant controversy. Reviewing
ASWMA, Judge Howard found the
purpose to protect the public health
and welfare by preventing air or
water pollution damage to the
environment through punishing
improper transportation., process-
ing, or abandonment of hazardous
substances. In AHWAMA. the
Court found the purpose to prevent
environmental damage through is-
management of hazardous wastes.
Finally, under AWAPCA, the state
prohibits causing water pollution.
Noting a remedy provision in each
statute, the Court held that given
their language, subject matter.
objective and purpose, Dow's no-
cause-of-action claim was illogical
and defied reason.
The Court's analysis of RATFA.
however, yielded a different result.
After considering RATFA's lan-
guage, intent, and prior interpreta-
tions, the Court found for Dow.
holding that no cause of action for
natural damages existed. In a swift
dismissal, the Court held the State's
complaint was a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that
the plaintiff was entitled to relief in
accord with FRCP 8(a).
Dow hoped to void the suit under
protection of Arkansas' statute of
limitations. Dow contended that as
a criminal offense, the two-year
limitation applied. First the Court
noted that statutory construction
determines if a penalty is criminal
or civil. As a threshold matter, the
Court stated that the Arkansas
General Assembly intended these
penalties to be civil damages in
nature, but refused to end the
analysis there. Looking to the
Supreme Court's guidance, the
Court determined that the remedies
involved were not so punitive that
they transform a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty. In so holding, the
Court weighed the regulatory na-
180 MELPR
Case Summaries
ture, the environmentally protective
focus, and the circumstances sur-
rounding the penalties to reach its
conclusion.
In another instance of statutory
construction, the Court explored the
intent of each statutory provision to
detennine if, in accordance with
Supreme Court guidance, the Ar-
kansas legislature clearly intended
for the acts to function retroac-
tively. The Court discovered that
AWAPCA was not being applied
retroactively. The provisions of the
act allow the state to bring natural
resource claims for present damage
to state controlled waters. As for the
two remaining acts, the Court found
that the legislatures did clearly
intend for them to apply retroac-
tively. Casting aside Dow's due
process claim, the Court, after
finding no improper retroactive
statutory application, held that the
claims are not repugnant to the
notice provision of the Due Process
Clause.
Weighing the final procedural
challenge, the Court held that the
State properly amended its com-
plaint to bring the natural resource
damages claims, but failed to
properly bring claims that Dow
aided and abetted Vertac in de-
frauding the state. Citing FRCP
15(c)(2), the Court ruled that the
claim asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth
set forth in the original pleading.
Since the transactions related to the
aiding and abetting charge were not
an "amplification or clarification"
of prior pleadings, the Court held
that they failed to meet the consent
decree time constraints to amend
claims. However, the statutory
damage claims were found to be
sufficiently related. and thus were
accepted as timely amendments to
the claim.
The Court held that where parties
enter into a consent decree subse-
quent claims for natural resource
damages, permissible under Arkan-
sas statutes and the United States
Constitution, if not negotiated by
the decree, may be timely added to
the complaint and are not barred by
res judicata.
-Richard A. Hill
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v.
Flanders Electric Motor Service,
Inc., 131 F.3d 625, (7th Cir.1997).
Flanders Electric Motor
Service, Inc. ("Flanders") brought
this action seeking relief from final
judgment from a decision handed
down by the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals upholding Cincinnati In-
surance Co.'s ("Cincinnati") deci-
sion to deny coverage to Flanders
for damages stemming from an
environmental contamination claim
involving Flanders. The court ruled
against Flanders' motion for relief
from the prior judgment.
Flanders is a motor sale and
repair business located in Evans-
ville, Indiana. From 1971 to 1988,
Flanders sent several electronic
transfonners from Indiana to the
Missouri Electrical Works ("MEW")
for repairs. On at least two
occasions, the transformers may
have contained fluids contaminated
with PCBs. An investigation at the
MEW site by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") re-
vealed that leaks from oil drums and
transfonners over several years
resulted in a substantial PCB
contamination. The EPA notified
Flanders and 600 other businesses
that they could be held partially
responsible under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act.
In September of 1989,
Flanders notified Cincinnati that
Flanders was considered a poten-
tially liable party at the MEW site.
At the time, Flanders had one
general insurance policy and two
umbrella insurance policies with
Cincinnati that covered property
damage claims. Flanders asserted
that Cincinnati was required to
defend Flanders against the asserted
claims. Each of the policies had a
pollution exclusion clause that
stated the policies did not provide
coverage for damage to property
that arose from pollution, unless the
release of pollutants was character-
ized as "sudden or accidental."
Cincinnati denied Flanders'
request for coverage on the basis of
the pollution exclusion clauses.
They filed a declaratory judgment
in federal district court in Novem-
ber 1991, asking for the court to
uphold Cincinnati's decision to
deny coverage. Cincinnati later
filed a summary judgment motion
in August 1992, asking the court to
deny any claim Flanders' had to
insurance coverage. The district
court granted the motion for
summary judgment in October
1993, holding that the phrase
"sudden and accidental" was clear
and unambiguous, and coverage to
Flanders was denied. Flanders first
asked the court to reconsider the
motion, which the court denied,
Flanders then appealed the decision
to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Oral argument on the
appeal was held in April of 1994. In
September of 1994, the Indiana
Supreme Court agreed to hear an
appeal of a case, American States
Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945
(Ind.1996), dealing with the same
general issues as were present in the
Flanders case. At the time, Indiana
law was unsettled on the issue of the
"sudden and accidental" language
found in the insurance policy. Soon
after this case was accepted by the
Indiana Supreme Court, Flanders
MELPR 181
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filed a Motion for Stay of
Proceedings with the court of
appeals, asking it to wait until the
Kiger decision was made.
The 7th Circuit denied
Flanders request for a stay, and in
November of 1994, issued a ruling
upholding Cincinnati's denial of
coverage. The court found that,
even though the Indiana law was
still unsettled on the issue, the court
was confident the Indiana Supreme
Court would find the term "sudden
and accidental" was not ambiguous,
and therefore precluded coverage of
the property damage.
In March of 1996, the
Indiana Supreme Court decided
Kiger. That court determined that
the words "sudden and accidental"
as used in the pollution exclusion
clause were ambiguous, and was in
favor of providing coverage where
the insured showed the-contamina-
tion was "unexpected" or "unin-
tended." As a result of the Kiger
decision, Flanders filed a Motion
for Relief from Final Judgment,
pursuant to federal rules of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6).
The district court denied Flanders'
motion, and this appeal resulted.
.The court of appeals re-
viewed the motion for an abuse of
discretion. In doing so, the court
looked to see if the trial.court was
within legal principals in making its
decision, and applied those princi-
pals to the case within the range a
reasonable judge would use. The
court stated that it is an "extraordi-
nary remedy" to provide relief from
judgment and the burden of proving
the abuse of discretion was with the
appellant.
Rule 60(b) authorizes courts
to relieve a party from final
judgment for a variety of reasons.
Under Rule 60(b)(5), the court may
grant relief where the decision made
is prospective in nature, or that the
decision is no longer equitable.
Rule 60(b)(6) allows the court to
provide relief where extraordinary
circumstances exist. The court
found that neither of these situations
applied in the present case.
In addressing the extraordi-
nary circumstances argument, the
court noted that in diversity cases,
the court is not required to reopen a
case simply because the applicable
law in the state has changed. Citing
a need to have finality in cases, the
court stated that where the federal
courts failed to correctly predict
how the state court would decide an
issue, there are no grounds for
setting aside the federal court
decision. The court stated that
allowing a diversity case to reopen
every time a state changed its law
would be the equivalent of holding
the "doctrine of finality" does not
apply in diversity cases.
Flanders argued the deci-
sion was no longer equitable due to
the fact that other potentially liable
parties at the MEW site were being
provided coverage because of the
Kiger decision. Also, Cincinnati
provided coverage to Flanders
under the same insurance policies
for damages to MEW's neighbor,
who was claiming damage to
adjacent property from contamina-
tion at the MEW site. This inequity,
Flanders argued, was due to the 7th
Circuit's refusal to stay the original
decision until after the Kiger case
was decided.
The court rejected this
argument, stating that from when
the appeal was filed to when the
decision was made was longer than
the average time the 7th Circuit
spent disposing of cases. This, the
court said, was not an "early ruling",
as Flanders argued. The court also
noted the request by Flanders did
not occur until one month prior to
the decision being handed down.
and termed this a last minute
request. While the court acknowl-
edged that Flanders was disadvan-
taged by the situation, the hardship
and unfairness was not sufficient to
uphold the motion.
The court next addressed
the issue of the decision's
prospectivity. The court admitted
that, while almost every court case
had some future consequence, it
does not automatically make the
decision prospective. The court
reasoned that the judgment in this
case was a declaration of the party's
rights as they existed at the time of
the decision. They did not contain
provisions that were "executory" or
involved "the supervision of chang-
ing conduct or conditions" which
were required to make an action
prospective.
Finally, the court briefly
addressed the issue under Rule
60(b)(5) of the decision's equity.
Since the court found the decision
was not prospective, the inequitable
nature of the decision was not at
issue. However, the court noted that
even though this standard of
unfaimess was less than required
under Rule 60(b)(6), it still had not
been met. In reachine this
conclusion, the court stated that the
inequities created by the original
decision were "unextraordinary",
and did not outweigh the policy
favoring the finality of decisions.
-Robert Bilbrey
CWA
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d
251 (4th Cir. 1997).
In 1996, James Wilson was
convicted of violating federal
regulations promulgated under the
Clean Water Act ("the Act")
prohibiting dredging and filling a
wetland without a permit. Wilson
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was developing part of the planned
community of St. Charles, Mary-
land, situated between the Potomac
River and the Chesapeake Bay. The
area Wilson was developing was
located near a swamp and was
designated on topographical maps
as a wetland. The Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") argued that
four parcels of land within the area
Wilson was developing were wet-
lands. The Corps charged Wilson
with violating its rule prohibiting
the discharge of pollutants on a
wetland without a permit. Under
the rules, Wilson had discharged a
pollutant by digging ditches around
the parcels and depositing the dirt
next to the ditches in order to drain
the land. The Fourth Circuit Court
ofAppeals held that the land at issue
was a wetland, but reversed
Wilson's conviction because the
regulation defining the Corps'
jurisidiction over the land exceeded
Congress' delegation of authority
under the Act in that it encompassed
areas Congress could not reach
under the Conuerce Clause.
The Court first determined
whether the parcels were wetlands.
The Corps introduced evidence at
trial establishing that the area at
issue was a wetland. This included
maps that designated the area as a
wetland and evidence that the
parcels had properties characteristic
ofwetlands. For instance, the Corps
showed that water on the land ran in
hydrologic cycles through
intermittenT streams to the Potomac
River and finally to the Chesapeake
Bay and that the land also contained
wetland-typical vegetation. But
despite the land's classification as a
wetland, the Court held that the Act
did not permit its regulation. The
Court focused on the appropriate-
ness of the jurisdiction-setting
regulation rather than the constitu-
tionality of the Act itself under the
Commerce Clause.
The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and. the Corps share
regulatory jurisdiction under the
Act, which prohibits discharges of
dredge or fill material without a
permit into "navigable waters." 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). The Act defines
"navigable waters" as "waters ofthe
United States." Id. The Corps has
interpreted this provision as extend-
ing its regulatory authority to
wetlands, whether they be adjacent
to a navigable water or not. The
regulation states that the Corps may
regulate any water whose degrada-
tion "could affect" interstate com-
merce. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)
(1993). Wilson challenged this
construction of the statute, contend-
ing that the regulation exceeded
Congress' delegation of authority to
the Corps because the commerce
power could not reach wholly
intrastate wetlands. He also
challenged the jury instructions
used at trial based on the regulation.
The jury instructions set forth, in
part, that if the degradation or
destruction of the land could affect
interstate commerce, then the Corps
could assert jurisdiction over the
land at issue.
The Fourth Circuit saw this
regulation defining the Corps'
authority as contrary to the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. It conceded that Congress,
by defining "navigable waters" as
"waters of the United States," did
intend to bring in some waters that
would not be deemed "navigable"
under the classic definition of the
term. Thus, the Wilson Court held
that some unnavigable waters may
be regulated. However, the Court
felt that this specific regulation was
ultra vires because it not only
surpassed "navigable waters," but
extended further to waters that are
not even closely related to navi-
gable or interstate waters. It
therefore ruled that the Corps
exceeded its authority under the Act
in promulgating the rule, and struck
it down.
The Fourth Circuit panel
also agreed that the mnens rea
required to prove a felony violation
of the Act accompanies each
element of the underlying offense.
Section 1319(c)(2)(A) of the Act
states that a person who "knowingly
violates section 1311" (discharging
a pollutant into "navigable waters")
"shall be punished." The Court
interpreted this section as requiring
the government to prove the
defendant's knowledge of facts
meeting each element of the
substantive offense. The Court
maintained, however, that the
government need not prove that the
defendant knew that his conduct
was illegal. Thus, the Court
outlined that the government must
prove that the defendant, first, knew
he was discharging a substance;
second, knew what substance he
was discharging; third, knew the
method or instrumentality used to
discharge the substance; fourth,
knew the physical characteristics of
the land into which the substance
was discharged; fifth, was aware of
the facts establishing the wetland's
link to "waters of the United
States;" and sixth, knew that he did
not have a permit. In conclusion,
the Fourth Circuit in Wilson ruled
that the Corps misinterpreted its
jurisdiction under the Act, expand-
ing "waters of the United States"
beyond its definitional limit, and
that in order to establish a violation
of the Act, the government must
prove the requisite mens rea with
regard to each material element.
-Stephen S. Davis
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Bensman v. United States Forest
Service, 1997 WL 719770 (W.D.
Mo. 1997).
In March, 1997, a wind-
storm in the Mark Twain National
Forest (MTNF) near Alton, Mis-
souri, damaged nearly 700 acres of
timber. As a result, after a period of
public comment and after the
required consultation with the Fish
and Wildlife Service, the National
Forest Service sold contracts on
approximately 700,000 board/feet
of lumber to three family-owned
logging companies. Pursuant to the
agreement, the companies were to
harvest trees that were "blown
down, leaning, or uprooted" by the
March windstorm. The areas that
would be affected by the salvage
operation are at least two miles from
White's Cave, the home of between
20 and 30 Indiana Bats. Indiana
bats were first listed as an
endangered species in. 1967, and
have continually declined since then
despite numerous efforts at preserv-
ing the species.
In late September, 1997,
plaintiffs, three members of the
environmental group Heartwood,
filed a pro se action against the
Forest Service and the Fish and
Wildlife Service in Federal District
Court, Western District of Mis-
souri, alleging that the guidelines set
forth within NEPA and the ESA
were not followed with respect to
the three salvage contracts sold after
the March windstorm, and with
respect to a harvesting operation
know as the "Panther Hollow
project." The court, upon filing,
issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) on the proposed
salvaging.
Less than a month later, a
hearing was held on a preliminary
injunction. The court allowed the
three logging companies that pur-
chased contracts, and two timber
industry associations to intervene.
The order granting the injunction
will not be appealed, because at the
time of the contract sale the timber
was on the verge of rotting. By the
time any action on appeal could be
taken, the timber would most
certainly be worthless. Thus, the
defendants determined that any
further action on the issue would be
moot.
Plaintiffs first argued that
the Forest Service violated the ESA
by failing to place top priority on
the conservation of the Indiana bat.
They next argued that the Forest
Service failed to consider a study
done on the bats and which times of
the year harvesting timber would
most affect the bats. They then
argued that harvesting the timber
would harm or harass the bats.
Plaintiffs also argued that the Forest
Service did not enter into formal
consultation with the Fish and
Wildlife Service. Finally, they
argued that the Forest Service and
the Fish and Wildlife Service failed
to filly examine the consequences
of the harvest as required by NEPA.
Defendants countered that
the court lacked jurisdiction be-
cause Heartwood failed to give the
statutory 60-day notice. They then
argued that the court should apply a
traditional balancing test, weighing
the threat of irreparable harm to the
species, the balance between this
harm and the harm created by
granting an injunction, the probabiliy
of movant's success, and the public
interest.
In granting the preliminary
injunction, Judge Russell Clark of
the District Court declared that
Heartwood had satisfied the 60 day
notice requirement by stating to the
Regional Forester that "if this
project and the Pahther Hollow
Decision are not remanded... (they]
plan[ed] to promptly file a lawsuit
challenging both decisions." Heart-
wood also informed the Fish and
Wildlife Service that they intended
to "sue over rubber-stamping" the
two projects. The court then
decided that, contrary to the Forest
Service's argument that a balancing
test should have been used, the
proper standard was to detennine
whether letting the salvage contracts
was arbitrary and capricious. In
doing so, the court noted that the
intent of Congress in enacting the
ESA was to require Federal
agencies to place endangered spe-
cies "at the top of their priority list,
and that the actions of the Forest
Service indicated that they did not."
Furthermore, the court found that
even by applying the standard as
suggested by the Forest Service, the
value of protecting the bat out-
weighed the value of harvesting the
timber. The court also decided that
the Forest Service failed to formally
consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service. Finally, the court decided
that there was no "hard look" given
to the proposed harvest by the Fish
and Wildlife Service as required by
NEPA.
Ultimately, the court held
that despite the Forest Service's and
the Fish and Wildlife Services's
actions in deciding to allow the
timber salvage operations to occur,
the requirements of the ESA were
not satisfied, and the habitat of the
Indiana bat would be destroyed.
Thus, the court determined that
contrary to the beliefs of the Forest
Service and the Fish and Wildlife
Service, the habitat of the Indiana
bat would be adversely affected by
timber salvage operations. and
granting an injuction was appropri-
ate to halt the harvest.
-Benjamin A. Joplin
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